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Abstract
1 We consider a cooperative wireless network in the presence of one of more eavesdroppers, and
exploit node cooperation for achieving physical (PHY) layer based security. Two different cooperation
schemes are considered. In the first scheme, cooperating nodes retransmit a weighted version of the source
signal in a decode-and-forward (DF) fashion. In the second scheme, while the source is transmitting,
cooperating nodes transmit weighted noise to confound the eavesdropper (cooperative jamming (CJ)).
We investigate two objectives, i.e., maximization of achievable secrecy rate subject to a total power
constraint, and minimization of total power transmit power under a secrecy rate constraint. For the first
design objective with a single eavesdropper we obtain expressions for optimal weights under the DF
protocol in closed form, and give an algorithm that converges to the optimal solution for the CJ scheme;
while for multiple eavesdroppers we give an algorithm for the solution using the DF protocol that is
guaranteed to converge to the optimal solution for two eavesdroppers. For the second design objective,
existing works introduced additional constraints in order to reduce the degree of difficulty, thus resulting
in suboptimal solutions. In this work, either a closed form solution is obtained, or algorithms to search
for the solution are proposed. Numerical results are presented to illustrate the proposed schemes and
demonstrate the advantages of cooperation as compared to direct transmission.
Index Terms
Secrecy rate, node cooperation, physical layer based security, semi-definite programming.
1This work has been supported by NSF under Grant CNS-0905425. Parts of this work were reported in [1], [2].
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1I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy and security issues play an important role in wireless networks. Although security is typically
addressed via cryptographic approaches, there have been several attempts at addressing security at the
physical layer, following the pioneering work of [8]. Recently wireless physical (PHY) layer based
security from a information-theoretic point of view has received considerable attention, e.g., [3]-[7]. The
wiretap channel, first introduced and studied by Wyner [8], is the most basic physical layer model that
captures the problem of communication security. Wyner showed that when an eavesdropper’s channel
is a degraded version of the main channel, the source and destination can achieve a positive perfect
information rate (secrecy rate). The maximal secrecy rate from the source to the destination is defined as
the secrecy capacity and for the degraded wiretap channel is given as the difference between the rate at the
legitimate receiver and the rate at the eavesdropper. The Gaussian wiretap channel, in which the outputs at
the legitimate receiver and at the eavesdropper are corrupted by additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN),
was studied in [9]. Along the same lines, the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel was investigated and the
secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel was established in terms of an optimization problem over
all possible input covariance matrices [10], [13]. There have also been some recent works focusing on
secrecy rates based on partial CSI or channel statistics [3], [4], [15]. In [15], the authors derived the
ergodic secrecy capacity of Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel and showed that a circularly symmetric
Gaussian input is optimal.
The secrecy rate is affected by channel conditions between the source and the destination and also
channel conditions between the source and the eavesdroppers. A low cost approach to increase the
achievable secrecy rate by exploiting/mitigating channel effects is node cooperation via relays [16]-[21].
A two-stage cooperative approach was recently proposed in [22], [23], and their extended version [24].
In [24], the source first transmits locally to a set of trusted relays, and subsequently, the relays retransmit
a weighted version of the signal that they heard (amplify-and-forward (AF)), or a weighted version of
the decoded signal (decode-and-forward (DF)). Alternatively, the relays can transmit weighted noise to
confound the eavesdropper while the source is transmitting (cooperative jamming (CJ)). In all cases, the
objective is to select the weights so as to maximize the secrecy rate under total power constraints, or to
minimize the total power under a secrecy rate constraint. The results in [22]-[24] contain sub-optimal
weights for both a single eavesdropper and multiple eavesdroppers, due to the difficulty of solving
the associated optimization problems. In particular, several criteria for sub-optimal weight design were
proposed such as completely nulling out the message signal at all eavesdroppers for DF and AF, and
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2completely nulling out the jamming signal at the destination for CJ. These sub-optimal weights may yield
a reduction in the achievable secrecy rate or minimization of total power.
In this paper, we consider the same scenario and problem as in [22]-[24], but focus on obtaining the
optimal solution for the DF and CJ schemes. Obtaining the solution for the AF scheme is a more difficult
problem and will be addressed in future work. Exploiting certain properties of the objective functions
and the constraints, enables us to either obtain closed form solutions, or, if a closed form solution is not
possible, propose algorithms to search for the solution.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The mathematical model is introduced in §II.
In §III we derive the optimal relay weights that maximize the achievable secrecy rate subject to a total
power constraint in the presence of a single eavesdropper for the DF and CJ protocols, and multiple
eavesdroppers for DF protocol. In §IV we study the optimal weights that minimize the total power under
a secrecy rate constraint for the DF and CJ protocols. Numerical results in §V are presented to illustrate
the proposed solutions. Finally, §VI provides some concluding remarks.
A. Discussion of related work
Our work falls under the general scenario where the source-destination communication is aided by
a relay or a helper. Relevant results include the work of [16], where multiple users communicate with
a common receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper, and the transmit power allocation policy is
determined that maximizes the secrecy sum-rate. In [17], a source, destination, eavesdropper and relay
model is considered, in which the relay transmits a noise signal in order to jam the eavesdropper. The
rate-equivocation region is derived to show gains and applicable scenarios for cooperation, with the
equivocation denoting the uncertainty of the eavesdropper about the source message.
A generalization of [16] and [17] was proposed in [18], in which the helper transmits signals from
another source encoder. In [19], inner and outer bounds on the rate-equivocation region were derived for
the four-node model for both discrete memoryless and Gaussian channels. In [21], the secrecy rate of
orthogonal relay and eavesdropper channels was studied.
Our work in this paper is different from the aforementioned works in the sense that we address the
more general case of multiple relays and multiple eavesdroppers. Also, existing works primarily focus
on rate-achieving relaying strategies. In our work, we consider pre-defined cooperative schemes without
claiming that those schemes are optimal, and determine relay weight and power allocation design that
optimize the achievable secrecy rate subject to a power constraint, or minimize the transmit power subject
to a secrecy rate constraint.
January 9, 2010 DRAFT
3B. Notation
Upper case and lower case bold symbols denote matrices and vectors, respectively. Superscripts ∗, T
and † denote respectively conjugate, transposition and conjugate transposition. Tr(A) denotes the trace
of matrix A. A  0 means that A is a Hermitian positive semi-definite matrix. rank(A) denotes the
rank of matrix A. ‖a‖ denotes Euclidean norm of vector a. In denotes the identity matrix of order n (the
subscript is dropped when the dimension is obvious). f ′(x) and f ′′(x) denote first- and second- order
derivatives of f(x), respectively.
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Fig. 1. System model: source S wishes to communicate to destination D in the presence of J eavesdroppers, E1, . . . , EJ .
The N relays, R1, . . . , RN implement decode and forward (DF) or cooperative jamming (CJ), based protocols. In each case
the objective is to select the relay weights (w) and the source power (Ps) to maximize the achievable secrecy rate subject to a
total power constraint (P0), or to minimize the total power constraint under a secrecy rate constraint.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a wireless network model depicted in Fig. 1, consisting of one source node S, a set
of N relay nodes (Ri, i = 1, . . . , N), a destination node D, and a set of J passive eavesdroppers
(Ej , j = 1, . . . , J). The symbols used in the paper are listed in Table I.
The source message is uniformly distributed over the message set W = {1, 2, ..., 2nR}, which is
transmitted in n channel uses. Here, R denotes the source rate (unit: bits per channel use) and the
message has entropy nR bits. A stochastic encoder at the source maps each message to a codeword
from an alphabet of length-n. For the purpose of evaluating the achievable secrecy rate, we assume that
the codewords used at the source are Gaussian. We consider a time division multiple access system, in
which there are n time units in each transmission slot. In a time unit, the average power of an encoded
source symbol is normalized to unity. The noise at any node is assumed to be zero-mean white complex
Gaussian with variance σ2. Each node is equipped with a single omni-directional antenna and operates
in a half-duplex mode.
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4TABLE I
MATHEMATICAL NOTATION
N number of relays
J number of eavesdroppers
P0 total power (source power plus the relays’ power)
Ps transmit power at the source
σ2 noise variance
h0 baseband complex channel gain between the source and the destination
hi baseband complex channel gain between the ith relay and the destination
ai baseband complex channel gain between the source and the ith relay
g0j baseband complex channel gain between the source and the jth eavesdropper
gij baseband complex channel gain between the ith relay and the jth eavesdropper
w weight vector at the relays, [w1, · · · , wN ]T
h [h1, · · · , hN ]
T
gj [g1j , · · · , gNj ]
T
Rh hh
†
Rjg gjg
†
j
Notes: The index j is dropped when J = 1.
All channels are assumed to be flat fading. We assume that global channel state information (CSI) is
available, including the eavesdroppers’ channels. This corresponds to the cases where the eavesdroppers
are active in the network and their transmissions can be monitored [25]. We should note that there have
been some recent works focusing on secrecy rates based on partial CSI or channel statistics (e.g., chapter
5 in [7], and [4]). Adapting the proposed work to cooperative schemes that uses partial CSI or channel
statistics will be considered in future work.
Similarly as in [20], [24], we assume that the source encoding scheme, the decoding methods at
destination and eavesdroppers, and the cooperative protocol, are all public information.
Let us fix the relay weight vector w and the source transmission power Ps. Then the following
expressions give the rates with the destination and the eavesdroppers as a function of w, Ps, the noise
σ2, and the various channel gains. For the DF-based protocol, the rate at the destination and the jth
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5eavesdropper are, respectively
Rd =
1
2
log
(
1 +
Ps|h0|2 +w†Rhw
σ2
)
, (1)
Rje =
1
2
log
(
1 +
Ps|g0j |2 +w†Rjgw
σ2
)
(2)
where the scalar factor 1/2 is due to the fact that two time units are required in two stages. Here we have
assumed an additional constraint, i.e., Ps ≥ Pmin0 where Pmin0 is the minimum source power requirement
for cooperative nodes to correctly decode the source message with high probability. We assume Pmin0
is known a priori. For the CJ-based protocol, the rate at the destination and the jth eavesdropper are,
respectively
Rd = log
(
1 +
Ps|h0|2
w†Rhw + σ2
)
, (3)
Rje = log
(
1 +
Ps|g0j |2
w†R
j
gw + σ2
)
. (4)
For both the DF and CJ protocols, the achievable secrecy rate in the presence of J eavesdroppers is given
by [26]
Rs = max{0, Rd − max
1≤j≤J
Rje}. (5)
In particular, when J = 1, i.e., a single eavesdropper, the secrecy rate in (5) becomes [13], [14]
Rs = max{0, Rd −Re}. (6)
We consider the practical case in which the system can be designed so that the secrecy rate is positive.
In that case, the achievable secrecy rate can be rewritten as
Rs = Rd − max
1≤j≤J
Rje. (7)
Achievability of the above rates can be shown based on existing results for MIMO wire-tap channels,
such as [11], [14], [12], for one eavesdropper, and [26] for multiple eavesdroppers.
The CJ scheme can be viewed as a 1×2 SIMO system, so that MIMO results are directly applicable. As
discussed in [24], for the DF scheme, MIMO results are applicable if we assume that the received signal
at destination/eavesdropper at time i depends only on the relays’ transmitted encoded signals at time i
(though a relay’s transmitted signal at time i depends on its received signal before time i). This is usually
referred to as the “memoryless relay channel” [17], [19]. For convenience, as in [24] we focus on case in
which the relays use the same codewords as the source to re-encode the signal before transmission; in that
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6case the rates of source-destination and source-eavesdropper links admit simple closed-form expressions
[24].
The problems addressed in this paper are described as follows.
Problem 1 (maximize secrecy rate under power constraint using DF): Given total power (source
plus relays) P0, select source power Ps and cooperative nodes’ weights w to maximize the secrecy rate
max
Ps,w
Rs s.t. Ps + ‖w‖2 = P0, Ps ≥ Pmin0 . (8)
where Rs is given by (1), (2) and (7).
The solution of Problem 1 for one eavesdropper is provided in Section III-A1, and for multiple eaves-
droppers in Section III-B.
Problem 2 (maximize secrecy rate under power constraint using CJ): Given total power (source
plus relays) P0, select source power Ps and cooperative nodes’ weights w to maximize the secrecy rate
max
Ps,w
Rs s.t. Ps + ‖w‖2 = P0. (9)
where Rs is given by (3), (4) and (7).
The solution of Problem 2 for one eavesdropper is provided in Section III-A2.
Problem 3 (minimize transmit power under secrecy rate constraint using DF): Given the secrecy
rate constraint R0s , select the source power Ps and cooperative nodes’ weights, w, to minimize the total
power (source plus relays)
min
Ps,w
[
P0 = Ps + ‖w‖2
]
s.t. Rs = R
0
s, Ps ≥ Pmin0 (10)
where Rs is given by (1), (2) and (7).
The solution of Problem 3 is provided in Section IV-A.
Problem 4 (minimize transmit power under secrecy rate constraint using CJ): Given the secrecy
rate constraint R0s , select the source power Ps and cooperative nodes’ weights, w, to minimize the total
power (source plus relays)
min
Ps,w
[
P0 = Ps + ‖w‖2
]
s.t. Rs = R
0
s (11)
where Rs is given by (3), (4) and (7).
The solution of Problem 4 is provided in Section IV-B.
Before proceeding, we provide Lemma 1 and 2, which will be the basis of the results to follow. Please
see Appendix A and B for details.
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7Lemma 1: Let r and s be (known) linearly uncorrelated vectors. Let θ be the argument of r†s. Denote
i =
√−1. The matrix rr† − ss† has only two nonzero eigenvalues, i.e., η1 > 0 and η2 < 0, given by
η1 = ‖r‖2 − |c2||r†s|, η2 = ‖r‖2 − |c4||r†s|. (12)
The corresponding eigenvectors are
e1 = c1(r+ |c2|ei(pi−θ)s), e2 = c3(r+ |c4|ei(pi−θ)s) (13)
where c1 = 1/
√
‖r‖2 + |c2|2‖s‖2 − 2|c2||r†s| , c3 = 1/
√
‖r‖2 + |c4|2‖s‖2 − 2|c4||r†s| , 2|c2||r†s| =
‖r‖2 + ‖s‖2 −
√
(‖r‖2 + ‖s‖2)2 − 4|r†s|2 , and 2|c4||r†s| = ‖r‖2 + ‖s‖2 +
√
(‖r‖2 + ‖s‖2)2 − 4|r†s|2 .
Lemma 2: Let d1 and d2 be (known) unit-norm vectors. Let φ ∈ (−pi, pi] be the argument of d†2d1,
r = |d†1d2|, and consider 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. The solution of
max
z
z†d2d
†
2z s.t. z
†d1d
†
1z = q, ‖z‖ = 1 (14)
is given by z◦ = c1d1+c2d2, where c2 =
√
(1− q)/(1 − r2) and c1 = (rc2−√q)ei(pi−φ). The maximum
is z◦†d2d†2z◦ = 1− (r
√
1− q −
√
(1 − r2)q)2.
III. SECRECY RATE MAXIMIZATION UNDER POWER CONSTRAINT
In this section, we address Problems 1 and 2.
A. One Eavesdropper (J = 1)
In this subsection we address Problem 1 for the case of a single eavesdropper. Since J = 1 we drop
the superscript j from Rje.
1) DF-based protocol: Problem 1 can be recast as
max
Ps,w
1
2
log
(
σ2 + Ps|h0|2 +w†Rhw
σ2 + Ps|g0|2 +w†Rgw
)
(15)
s.t. Ps ≥ Pmin0 ,w†w = P0 − Ps.
Denote u1 = g/‖g‖, u2 = h/‖h‖ and ζ = |u†1u2|. Let θ ∈ (−pi, pi] be the argument of u†2u1. The
solution of Problem 1 is given in the following theorem. The proof is given in Appendix C.
Theorem 1: The solution of (15) is given by
P ◦s =
 Pmin0 if J(Pmin0 ) > J(P0);P0 else; (16)
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8w◦ =
 c1u1 + c2u2 if J(Pmin0 ) > J(P0);0 else (17)
where the function J(Ps) is defined by
J(Ps) =
σ2 + Ps|h0|2 + (P0 − Ps)‖h‖2L(z(Ps))
σ2 + Ps|g0|2 + (P0 − Ps)‖g‖2z(Ps) (18)
and
L(z) , 1− (ζ√1− z −
√
(1− ζ2)z)2 (19)
z(Ps) = (B −
√
B2 − 4C)/(2bC)− a/b (20)
a = σ2 + Ps|g0|2,
b = (P0 − Ps)‖g‖2,
c = σ2 + Ps|h0|2 + (P0 − Ps)‖h‖2(1− ζ2),
d = (P0 − Ps)‖h‖2(1− 2ζ2),
f = 2(P0 − Ps)‖h‖2ζ
√
1− ζ2,
B = (2a+ b)/(a2 + ab),
C =
f2(2a+ b)2 + 4(ad + bc)2
4f2(a2 + ab)2 + 4(ad+ bc)2(a2 + ab)
c2 =
√
P0 − P ◦s
√
(1− z(P ◦s ))/(1 − ζ2)
c1 =
√
P0 − P ◦s (ζc2 −
√
z(P ◦s ))e
i(pi−θ).
Remarks: In particular, Theorem 1 states that, depending on the relative values of J(Pmin0 ) and J(P0),
the optimal solution is either i) the source uses minimum power and the relay weights are a linear
combination of the normalized relay and eavesdropper channel vectors, or ii) the source uses all the
power and the relays are unused.
2) CJ-based protocol: Problem 2 is recast as
max
Ps,w
log
(
1 +
Ps|h0|2
w†Rhw + σ2
)
− log
(
1 +
Ps|g0|2
w†Rgw + σ2
)
(21)
s.t. w†w = P0 − Ps, Ps ∈ [0, P0].
By denoting w =
√
P0 − Ps x, v1 = h/‖h‖, v2 = g/‖g‖, the problem of (21) can be rewritten as
max
Ps,x
log
(
1 +
Ps|h0|2
(P0 − Ps)‖h‖2x†v1v†1x+ σ2
)
− log
(
1 +
Ps|g0|2
(P0 − Ps)‖g‖2x†v2v†2x+ σ2
)
(22)
s.t. x†x = 1, Ps ∈ [0, P0].
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9Let x be a feasible point. Denote x†v1v†1x = z, z ∈ [0, 1]. For fixed z, a larger x†v2v†2x results in a
larger objective value. With this and from Lemma 2, we know that the optimal x†v2v†2x equals G(z)
where G(z) , 1− (η√1− z −
√
(1− η2)z)2, η = |v†1v2|. With these, we can rewrite the optimization
of (22) as
max
Ps,z
log
(
1 +
Ps
(P0 − Ps)α1z + α2
)
− log
(
1 +
Ps
(P0 − Ps)α3G(z) + α4
)
(23)
s.t. z ∈ [0, 1], Ps ∈ [0, P0]
where α1 = ‖h‖2/|h0|2, α2 = σ2/|h0|2, α3 = ‖g‖2/|g0|2 and α4 = σ2/|g0|2.
The problem of (23) makes sense when the maximum is greater than zero, i.e., when positive secrecy
rate is achieved. The conditions under which positive secrecy rate is achieved are given in the following
lemma. The proof is given in Appendix D.
Lemma 3: The condition under which positive secrecy rate is achieved is:
• α2 < α4 (i.e., |h0|2 > |g0|2);
• α2 > α4, P0 > (α2 −α4)/(α3G(z0)−α1z0) where z0 is the unique root of α3G′(z) = α1 given by
z0 = 1/(1+u
2
0), u0 = [α1/α3− (2η2− 1)+
√
(α1/α3)2 + 1− 2(α1/α3)(2η2 − 1) ]/(2η
√
1− η2).
Remarks: The second condition means that if the source-destination channel is weaker than source-
eavesdropper channel, direct transmission can not achieve positive secrecy rate, at that time, relays should
be used and the total power (source plus relay) should be greater than a threshold.
In the following analysis, we assume the conditions in Lemma 3 hold. Denote the objective in (23)
as M1(z). It is easy to show that M ′1(z) > 0. Thus, z = 0 is not the optimal point. Before proceeding,
we give a suboptimal solution which turns out to be the suboptimal solution proposed in [24] which is
a special case corresponding to z = 0 (please see Appendix E for details).
Lemma 4: When z = 0 is fixed, a suboptimal solution is given:
• if α2 > α4, P0 < (α2 − α4)/(α3(1− η2)), then Ps,sub = 0;
• if {α2 < α4 or α2 > α4, P0 > (α2 − α4)/(α3(1 − η2))} and (P0 + α4)α4 > (P0 + α2)(P0α3(1−
η2) + α4), then Ps,sub = P0;
• if {α2 < α4 or α2 > α4, P0 > (α2 − α4)/(α3(1 − η2))} and (P0 + α4)α4 < (P0 + α2)(P0α3(1−
η2) + α4), then Ps,sub = (−c3d2 +
√
c23d
2
2 − c3d2(1− d2)(α2 − c3))/(d2(1 − d2)), where d2 =
α3(1− η2), c3 = α4 + P0α3(1− η2).
Now we proceed. The methodology to solve the problem of (23) is: 1) fix z, find the optimal Ps; 2)
fix Ps, find the optimal z. Based on this, we propose an algorithm to search for the optimal Ps and z as
follows.
January 9, 2010 DRAFT
10
Algorithm 1: Take a feasible point z(1) as initial point. Subsequently, find the optimal P (1)s and then
the optimal z(2). Then find the optimal P (2)s , and so on. The procedure converges to the optimal P ◦s and
z◦.
The algorithm 1 is not complete without providing the methods to find the optimal z for fixed Ps
and the optimal Ps for fixed z. Next, we provide such methods. First, we consider the problem: find
the optimal Ps for fixed z. This corresponds to an optimization problem of a single variable Ps, and
the maximum is achieved at either 0, P0, or the points with zero derivative. Setting the derivative of the
objective to zero leads to the following quadratic equation
A1P
2
s +B1Ps + C1 = 0 (24)
where A1 = a1d1(1− d1)− b1c1(1− b1), B1 = 2a1c1(d1 − b1), C1 = a1c1(a1 − c1), a1 = P0α1z + α2,
b1 = α1z, c1 = P0α3G(z)+α4 and d1 = α3G(z). We can obtain Ps explicitly as a function of z. Second,
we consider the problem: when Ps is fixed, find the optimal z. This corresponds to an optimization
problem of a single variable z, and the maximum is achieved at one of the following points: 0, 1 and
the points with zero derivative. The problem to solve can now be rewritten as
max
z
Rs(z) = log
α1z + b3
α1z + a3
− log α3G(z) + d3
α3G(z) + c3
(25)
s.t. z ∈ [0, 1]
where a3 = α2/(P0−Ps), b3 = (α2+Ps)/(P0−Ps), c3 = α4/(P0−Ps) and d3 = (α4+Ps)/(P0−Ps).
The derivative of Rs(z) given by
R′s(z) ,
∂Rs
∂z
=
Ps
P0 − Ps
(
α3G
′(z)
(α3G(z) + c3)(α3G(z) + d3)
− α1
(α1z + a3)(α1z + b3)
)
. (26)
It is easy to verify that R′s(0) > 0, R′s(1) < 0. Thus, the optimal z must be the points with zero
derivative. Note that Rs(z) > 0 holds only when α1z+ a3 < α3G(z) + c3, which determines an interval
(z, z¯) ⊂ [0, 1]. Here z and z¯ can be expressed in closed form from the fact: if G(z) = β1z + β2 has
real roots over [0, 1], then its roots can be expressed as z = 1/(1 + u20) where u0 = (η
√
1− η2 ±√
η2(1− η2) + (β2 − 1 + η2)(η2 − β1 − β2))/(β2− 1+ η2). With these, we can restrict our attention to
the root of (26) over (z, z¯).
To proceed, we need the following result. The proof is given in Appendix F.
Property 1: For Rs(z) defined in (25), ∂2Rs∂z2
∣∣
z′
< 0 for the stationary point z′ ∈ (z, z¯) (i.e., the point
with ∂Rs∂z
∣∣
z′
= 0).
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According to Property 1, we know that the equation (26) has a unique root z′ such that when z < z′,
∂Rs
∂z > 0 and when z > z
′
,
∂Rs
∂z < 0. This property ensures that the Newton method would be very
effective in searching for z′ and would enjoy quadratic convergence.
B. Multiple Eavesdroppers
We now turn to the case of multiple eavesdroppers (J > 1). We restrict our attention to the DF protocol.
The CJ protocol case with multiple eavesdroppers is a more difficult problem and will be addressed in
future work.
Problem 1 now becomes
max
Ps,w
min
j∈I
1
2
log
σ2 + Ps|h0|2 +w†Rhw
σ2 + Ps|g0j |2 +w†Rjgw
(27)
s.t. Ps ∈ [Pmin0 , P0], w†w = P0 − Ps
where I = {1, · · · , J}, Pmin0 is defined as in the case of a single eavesdropper. By letting w =√
P0 − Ps x, we can rewrite the above problem as
max
Ps,x
min
j∈I
1
2
log
σ2 + Ps|h0|2 + (P0 − Ps)x†Rhx
σ2 + Ps|g0j |2 + (P0 − Ps)x†Rjgx
(28)
s.t. Ps ∈ [Pmin0 , P0], x†x = 1.
Before proceeding, we give a suboptimal solution which turns out to be the suboptimal solution in [24].
In [24], if N ≥ J+1, a suboptimal solution is obtained when an additional constraint is added: w†G = 0
where G = [g1,g2, · · · ,gJ ]. This additional constraint means nulling the energy to the eavesdroppers,
and this requires N > J so that we have enough degrees of freedom to ensure this is possible. The proof
is given in Appendix G.
Lemma 5: When the constraint w†G = 0 is added, a suboptimal solution is obtained as
Ps,sub =
 P0 if f2(P0) > f2(Pmin0 );Pmin0 else (29)
where the function f2(Ps) is defined by
f2(Ps) =
σ2 + Ps|h0|2 + (P0 − Ps)‖E†h‖2
σ2 + Psmaxj∈I{|g0j |2} (30)
and E is the null space of G† with E†E = I.
Now we proceed. The methodology to solve the problem of (28) is: 1) fix x, find the optimal Ps; 2)
fix Ps, find the optimal x. Based on this, we propose an algorithm to search for the optimal Ps and x
as follows.
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Algorithm 2: Take a feasible P (1)s as an initial point. Subsequently, find the optimal x(1) and then
the optimal P (2)s . Then find the optimal x(2), and so on.
Remarks: We will see later that: for J = 2, the procedure always converges to the optimal Ps and x,
while for J > 2 the procedure does not necessarily converge to the optimal solution. We will discuss
this in the sequel.
The algorithm 2 is not complete without providing the methods to find the optimal x for fixed Ps and
find the optimal Ps for fixed x. Next, we provide such methods.
First, we consider the problem: find the optimal Ps for fixed x. We need to solve
max
Ps
σ2 + Ps|h0|2 + (P0 − Ps)x†Rhx
σ2 +maxj∈I{Ps|g0j |2 + (P0 − Ps)x†Rjgx}
(31)
s.t. Ps ∈ [Pmin0 , P0].
Note that maxj∈I{Ps|g0j |2 + (P0 − Ps)x†Rjgx} denotes a polygonal line Γ whose vertices are located
at the points Ps,k, k = 0, 1, · · · ,M , Ps,0 = Pmin0 , Ps,M = P0. An example is plotted in Fig. 2. Note
that the objective in (31) is a linear fractional function and hence quasi-linear [27] in each line segment
Ps,kPs,k+1, k = 0, 1, · · · ,M − 1. Thus, the optimal Ps is one of the vertices of the polygonal, i.e., Ps,k,
k = 0, 1, · · · ,M − 1. It is easy to find Ps,k.
min
0
P
0
P
,1s
P ,2sP
1
l
2
l
3
l
4
l
Fig. 2. Polygonal line for the problem (31).
Second, we consider the problem: find the optimal x for fixed Ps. We need to solve
max
x
min
j∈I
σ2 + Ps|h0|2 + (P0 − Ps)x†Rhx
σ2 + Ps|g0j |2 + (P0 − Ps)x†Rjgx
(32)
s.t. x†x = 1.
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We can show that the problem of (32) is equivalent to
max
v
‖v‖2 s.t. v†Ajv ≤ 1, j ∈ I (33)
where
Aj = R˜
−1/2
h R˜
j
gR˜
−1/2
h , j ∈ I (34)
R˜h = (σ
2 + Ps|h0|2)I+ (P0 − Ps)Rh, (35)
R˜jg = (σ
2 + Ps|g0j |2)I+ (P0 − Ps)Rjg, j ∈ I. (36)
Let the solution of (33) be v◦. Then, the solution of (32) is given by x◦ = R˜−1/2h v◦/‖R˜−1/2h v◦‖. The
proof is given in Appendix H.
The problem of (33) belongs to the quadratic constrained quadratic programs (QCQP) which is in
general difficult [30], [31]. Denote Z = vv† which enables us to rewrite it as
max
Z
Tr(Z) s.t. Z  0, rank(Z) = 1,Tr(AjZ) ≤ 1, j ∈ I. (37)
Dropping the constraint rank(Z) = 1, the semi-definite relaxation (SDR) of the problem of (37) is given
by
max
Z
Tr(Z) s.t. Z  0,Tr(AjZ) ≤ 1, j ∈ I. (38)
This is a semi-definite program (SDP) and can be effectively solved by CVX [32].
If the problems of (33) and (38) achieve the same objective value, we say the SDR of (38) is tight
(its solution Z◦ does not necessarily have rank one). Obviously, if the solution Z◦ of (38) has rank one,
the SDR (38) is tight and the optimal solution v◦ of the problem of (33) can be obtained by simply
eigen-decomposing Z◦ = v◦v◦†. If Z◦ does not have rank one, the problem for the solution of (33) is
in general difficult [30], [31]. But for the special case J = 2, the problem can be solved in polynomial
time [30, §2.2], [31, Lemma 2.2.3]. We state it as the following theorem.
Theorem 2: When J = 2, the SDR (38) is always tight and the optimal solution for the problem of
(33) can be constructed in polynomial time.
For J > 2, if Z◦ does not have rank one, we use Gaussian randomization procedure (GRP) to obtain an
approximate solution based on the SDR solution [28], [29]. In detail, we calculate the eigen-decomposition
of Z◦ = UDU† and generate vl = µlUD1/2ξl for l = 1, · · · , L, where ξl is a vector of zero-mean,
unit-variance complex circularly symmetric uncorrelated Gaussian random variables, µl is chosen such
that maxj∈I v†lAjvl = 1 (i.e., the constraint of (33) holds). Suppose
l? = arg max
l
‖vl‖2. (39)
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Then select v(l?) as an approximation solution.
IV. TRANSMIT POWER MINIMIZATION UNDER SECRECY RATE CONSTRAINT
In this section, we address Problems 3 and 4.
A. DF-based protocol
Problem 3 is to solve
min
Ps,w
P0 = Ps + ‖w‖2 (40)
s.t.
σ2 + Ps|h0|2 +w†Rhw
σ2 + Ps|g0|2 +w†Rgw = 4
R0
s , Ps ≥ Pmin0 .
We provide a closed form solution to this problem which reveals that the optimal weight vector w◦ is a
linear combination of h and g. We give the main result of the problem as a theorem. The proof is given
in Appendix I.
Theorem 3: When 4R0s |g0|2 − |h0|2 6= 0,
(P ◦s ,w
◦) =

(ζ,0) if ζ ≥ Pmin0 , λ2 ≥ −1
(Pmin0 ,
√
ζ−Pmin
0
)
|λ2|
u2) if ζ ≥ Pmin0 , λ2 < −1
(Pmin0 ,
√
Pmin
0
−ζ
λ1
u1) if ζ < P
min
0
(41)
where ζ = (4R0s − 1)σ2/(|h0|2 − 4R0s |g0|2); λ1 > 0, λ2 < 0 are the only two nonzero eigenvalues of
R˜ = (Rh − 4R0sRg)/(4R0s |g0|2 − |h0|2) with associated eigenvectors u1 and u2 (see Lemma 1).
When 4R0s |g0|2 − |h0|2 = 0, the solution is
P ◦s = P
min
0 (42)
w◦ =
√
(4R0s − 1)σ2/ξ1 v1 (43)
where ξ1 > 0, ξ2 < 0 are the only two nonzero eigenvalues of (Rh−4R0sRg) with associated eigenvectors
v1 and v2 (see Lemma 1).
Before ending of this subsection, we should point out that the results in [22]-[24] address only the
case 4R
0
s |g0|2 − |h0|2 > 0, thus our analysis here is more complete. Further, our analysis reveals that
(Rh − 4R0sRg) has only two nonzero eigenvalues (one positive, and one negative) and, unlike [22]-[24],
provides simple expression for them.
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B. CJ-based protocol
Problem 4 is to solve
min
Ps,w
P0 = Ps + ‖w‖2 (44)
s.t.
|h0|2
w†Rhw + σ2
− 2
R0
s |g0|2
w†Rgw + σ2
=
2R
0
s − 1
Ps
, Ps > 0.
By denoting ‖w‖2 = γ, x = w/‖w‖, v1 = h/‖h‖, v2 = g/‖g‖, the problem of (44) can be rewritten
as
min
Ps,x
P0 = Ps + γ (45)
s.t.
|h0|2
γ‖h‖2x†v1v†1x+ σ2
− 2
R0
s |g0|2
γ‖g‖2x†v2v†2x+ σ2
=
2R
0
s − 1
Ps
, Ps > 0.
Let x be a feasible point, and x†v1v†1x = z, z ∈ [0, 1]. For fixed z and γ, a larger x†v2v†2x results
in a smaller Ps. With this and from Lemma 2, we know that the optimal x†v2v†2x equals F (z) where
F (z) , 1− (ρ√1− z −
√
(1− ρ2)z)2, ρ = |v†1v2|. With this in mind, we can rewrite (44) as
min
Ps, γ, z
P0 = Ps + γ (46)
s.t.
1
γα1z + α2
− 1
γα3F (z) + α4
=
1
Ps
,
z ∈ [0, 1], Ps > 0, γ ≥ 0
where α1 = ‖h‖2(2R0s − 1)/|h0|2, α2 = σ2(2R0s − 1)/|h0|2, α3 = ‖g‖2(2R0s − 1)/(2R0s |g0|2) and α4 =
σ2(2R
0
s − 1)/(2R0s |g0|2). Further, we can rewrite the problem of (46) as
min
γ, z
P0 =
(γα1z + α2)[γα3F (z) + α4]
γ(α3F (z) − α1z) + α4 − α2 + γ (47)
s.t. γ(α3F (z)− α1z) + α4 − α2 > 0,
z ∈ [0, 1], γ ≥ 0.
Before proceeding, we give a suboptimal solution which is turns out to be the same as the the suboptimal
solution of [24]. Please see Appendix J for details.
Lemma 6: When z = 0 is fixed, a suboptimal solution is pbtained as
P0,sub = Ps,sub + γsub (48)
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where
γsub =
 0 if
α4
α2
> 1 +
√
α3(1− ρ2)
α2
√
α3(1−ρ2)+α2−α4
α3(1−ρ2)
else.
(49)
Ps,sub =
1
1/α2 − 1/[γsubα3(1− ρ2) + α4] . (50)
Now we proceed. The methodology to solve the problem of (47) is: 1) fix z, find the optimal γ; 2)
fix γ, find the optimal z. Based on this, we propose an algorithm to search for the optimal γ and z as
follows.
Algorithm 3: Take a feasible point z(1) as initial point. Subsequently, find the optimal γ(1) and then
the optimal z(2). Then find the optimal γ(2), and so on. The procedure converges to the optimal γ◦ and
z◦.
The algorithm 3 is not complete without providing the methods to find the optimal z for fixed γ and
find the optimal γ for fixed z. Next, we provide such methods.
First, we consider the problem: find the optimal γ for fixed z. This corresponds to an optimization
problem of a single variable γ, and the maximum is achieved at one of the following points: 0 and the
points with zero derivative. With this, we obtain
γ = max
{√
f1(z)− (α4 − α2)
α3F (z)− α1z , 0
}
(51)
where f1(z) = (α2α3F (z) − α1α4z)2/[α3F (z) − α1z + α1α3zF (z)]. We can obtain γ explicitly as a
function of z (in this sense, we in fact reduce the original problem to a single variable optimization
P0 = P0(z), z ∈ [0, 1] explicitly).
Second, we consider the problem: when γ is fixed, find the optimal z. Let us denote the left side of
the first constraint in (46) by fγ(z), namely
fγ(z) =
1
γα1z + α2
− 1
γα3F (z) + α4
. (52)
We know that the optimal z must maximize fγ(z) which results in the minimal Ps (see (46)). The
derivative of fγ(z) given by
f ′γ(z) ,
∂fγ
∂z
=
−γα1
(γα1z + α2)2
+
γα3F
′(z)
(γα3F (z) + α4)2
. (53)
It is easy to verify that f ′γ(0) > 0, f ′γ(1) < 0. Thus, z = 0 is not the optimal point, and the optimal z
must be the points with zero derivative. Note that Ps > 0 (i.e., fγ(z) > 0) holds only when γα1z+α2 <
γα3F (z) + α4 which determines an interval (z, z¯) ⊂ [0, 1]. Here z and z¯ can be expressed in closed
form from the fact: if F (z) = β1z + β2 has real roots over [0, 1], then its roots can be expressed as
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z = 1/(1 + u20) where u0 = (ρ
√
1− ρ2 ±
√
ρ2(1− ρ2) + (β2 − 1 + ρ2)(ρ2 − β1 − β2))/(β2 − 1 + ρ2).
With these, we can restrict our attention to the root of (53) over (z, z¯).
To proceed, we need the following result. The proof is given in Appendix K.
Property 2: For fγ(z) defined in (52), ∂
2fγ
∂z2
∣∣
z′
< 0 for the stationary point z′ ∈ (z, z¯) (i.e., the point
with ∂fγ∂z
∣∣
z′
= 0).
According to Property 2, we know that the equation (53) has a unique root z′ such that when z < z′,
f ′γ(z) > 0 and when z > z′, f ′γ(z) < 0. This property ensures that the Newton method would be very
effective in searching for z′ and would enjoy quadratic convergence.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section we provide some numerical simulations to illustrate the proposed solutions. We use the
same system configuration as that in [24], where source, relays, destination and eavesdroppers are placed
along a line. Channels between any two nodes are modeled as a line-of-sight (LOS) channel ρ0d−c/2eiθ,
where d is the distance between two nodes, ρ0 is a constant, c is the path loss exponent, and θ is the
phase uniformly distributed within [0, 2pi). In our simulations we set c = 3.5 and ρ0 = 1. We assume the
distances between relays are much smaller than the distances between relays and source/desination, such
that the path loss between different relays and source/destination can be taken as approximately the same.
Similarly, the path loss between different eavesdroppers and source/destination/relay are approximately
the same as well. The results are obtained using Monte-Carlo simulations consisting of 500 independent
trials.
First, we vary the position of the destination so that the source-destination distance changes from 10m
to 100m, as shown in the upper row of Fig. 3. The source-relay distances are fixed at 5m, the number
of relays is N = 10, the source-eavesdropper distances are fixed at 50m, the power constraint is fixed at
30 dBm, the secrecy rate constraint is fixed at 1 bits/s/Hz. The secrecy rate for a single eavesdropper and
multiple eavesdroppers is depicted in Figs. 4 and 5, respectively. From these two figures, one can see that
when the destination moves past the eavesdropper direct transmission cannot sustain positive secrecy rate.
On the other hand, both DF and CJ maintain positive secrecy rate even when the destination is further
away from the source than the eavesdropper. The fact that there is a cooperation advantage even when
the destination is at the same location as the eavesdropper is because of the phases differences of the
corresponding channels. Although the propagation environment would be the same for both destination
and eavesdropper in that case, the phases will be different due to different receiver phase offsets. The DF
scheme yields the higher secrecy rate, while the optimal and suboptimal CJ schemes produce the same
January 9, 2010 DRAFT
18
average rate.
Similar observations can be drawn from Fig. 5 for the case of multiple eavesdropper as far as the
advantage of cooperation over direct transmission is concerned.
In Fig. 6, the secrecy rate for a fixed configuration and variable number of eavesdroppers is shown. It
can be seen from Fig. 6 that, when the number of eavesdroppers increases, the suboptimal solution for
DF in Lemma 5 becomes inferior as compared to the optimal solution. The minimal transmit power is
depicted in Fig. 7. For comparison purposes, the suboptimal solution for CJ in Lemma 4 and the direct
transmission result are also shown on the same figure.
Second, in Fig. 8, we show the performance when the eavesdroppers’ positions change while the
source-destination distance is fixed at 50m and the source-relay distances are fixed at 5m. When the
source-eavesdropper distance changes from 25m to 100m as shown in the lower row of Fig. 3, the
minimum transmit power for CJ first increases a little, and then decreases, while the minimum transmit
power for DF always decreases. The results show that cooperation can significantly improve the system
performance as compared to direct transmission. In particular, when the source-eavesdropper distance is
smaller than 65 m, using direct transmission there is no level of transmit power than can meet the secrecy
rate constraint. Also, for source-eavesdropper distance greater than 85 m direct transmission and the CJ
scheme are equivalent in terms of the minimum required transmit power. The DF approach requires
significantly smaller power to meet the secrecy rate constraint. It is interesting to note that in the average
sense, the suboptimal solution for CJ in Lemma 4 and Lemma 6 is a very good approximation of the
optimal solution.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have given explicit constructions for the optimal relay weights and source transmission power for
maximizing the secrecy rate or minimizing the total transmit power (source transmission power plus
relay power) under secrecy rate constraint using the DF and CJ protocols in the presence of a single
eavesdropper or multiple eavesdroppers. We present numerical results to compare the secrecy rate under
our optimal solutions with the secrecy rate under the sub-optimal solutions in [22]-[24]. Numerical
results illustrate that cooperation can significantly improve the system performance as compared to direct
transmission.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Let λ 6= 0 be the eigenvalue of rr†−ss† associated with the eigenvector a. Thus we have (rr†−ss†)a =
λa which leads to a = (1/λ)[r(r†a)− s(s†a)]. Thus, a has the form of a linear combination of r and s.
With this, we let a = pi1r+ pi2s where pi1 and pi2 will be determined as follows. Since a has unit norm,
we have
|pi1|2‖r‖2 + pi1pi∗2(s†r) + pi∗1pi2(r†s) + |pi2|2‖s‖2 = 1. (54)
On the other hand, by inserting a = pi1r+ pi2s into (rr† − ss†)a = λa, we get
[pi1(‖r‖2 − λ) + pi2(r†s)]r = [pi1(s†r) + pi2(‖s‖2 + λ)]s. (55)
Since r and s are linearly uncorrelated, we have
pi1(‖r‖2 − λ) + pi2(r†s) = pi1(s†r) + pi2(‖s‖2 + λ) = 0 (56)
which leads to
λ2 − (‖r‖2 − ‖s‖2)λ− (‖r‖2‖s‖2 − |r†s|2) = 0 (57)
pi2 =
λ− ‖r‖2
r†s
pi1. (58)
From Cauchy inequality, we get ‖r‖2‖s‖2 − |r†s|2 > 0. Thus, The equation (57) has a positive root and
a negative root. As a result, we obtain λ and the corresponding pi1 and pi2.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
The solution z◦ of (14) is a linear combination of d1 and d2, which follows from its optimality
condition d2d†2z − µ1d1d†1z − µ2z = 0 or further µ2z = (d†2z)d2 − (µ1d†1z)d1 where µ1 and µ2 are
Lagrange multipliers. Note that e−iθ2z◦ = e−iθ2c1d1 + |c2|d2 is also solution of (14), where θ2 is the
argument of c2. Consequently, we can restrict c2 ≥ 0. Inserting z = c1d1 + c2d2 into the constraints and
objective, results in
|c1|2 + c22 + c∗1c2d†1d2 + c1c2d†2d1 = 1 (59)
|c1|2 + c22|d†1d2|2 + c∗1c2d†1d2 + c1c2d†2d1 = q (60)
z†d2d
†
2z = 1− |c1|2(1− |d†1d2|2). (61)
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From (61), we need to minimize |c1|2. From (59) and (60), we get c22(1− |d†1d2|2) = 1− q which leads
to c2 =
√
(1− q)/(1− r2). By denoting c1 = |c1|eiθ where θ is the argument of c1, we can rewrite (59)
as
|c1|2 + |c1|c2r(e−i(φ+θ) + ei(φ+θ)) + (c22 − 1) = 0. (62)
It is not difficult to show that the optimal θ given by
θ =
 −φ if c22 − 1 < 0pi − φ if c22 − 1 ≥ 0 (63)
and the optimal |c1| is given by
|c1| =

√
q − c2r if c22 − 1 < 0
c2r −√q if c22 − 1 ≥ 0
. (64)
With these, we obtain the optimal c1 = (c2r −√q)ei(pi−φ). Further, from (61), we obtain
z†d2d
†
2z = 1− (c2r −
√
q)2(1− r2) = 1− (r
√
1− q −
√
(1− r2)q)2. (65)
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
First, we derive the optimal weight vector w for fixed Ps ≥ Pmin0 . By denoting w =
√
P0 − Ps x, we
can rewrite the problem of (15) as
max
x
1
2
log
(
σ2 + Ps|h0|2 + (P0 − Ps)‖h‖2x†u2u†2x
σ2 + Ps|g0|2 + (P0 − Ps)‖g‖2x†u1u†1x
)
(66)
s.t. x†x = 1.
Let x be a feasible point and x†u1u†1x = z, z ∈ [0, 1]. For fixed z, a larger x†u2u†2x results in a larger
objective value in the problem of (66). With this and from Lemma 2, we know that x†u2u†2x equals
L(z). Thus, the problem of (66) can be rewritten as
max
z
M(z) =
1
2
log
(
σ2 + Ps|h0|2 + (P0 − Ps)‖h‖2L(z)
σ2 + Ps|g0|2 + (P0 − Ps)‖g‖2z
)
(67)
s.t. 0 ≤ z ≤ 1.
This is an optimization problem of a single variable z. It is easy to show that M ′(0) > 0, M ′(1) < 0.
Thus, the optimal z must be the points with zero derivative, i.e., M ′(z) = 0. As a result, the solution of
(67), denoted by z(Ps) as a function of Ps, can be expressed in closed form (20).
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Next we consider the optimal Ps and let it be P ◦s . We can state that P ◦s is also the solution of the
following associated problem
max
Ps
1
2
log
(
σ2 + Ps|h0|2 + (P0 − Ps)‖h‖2L(z(P ◦s ))
σ2 + Ps|g0|2 + (P0 − Ps)‖g‖2z(P ◦s )
)
(68)
s.t. Ps ∈ [Pmin0 , P0].
To see why this is the case, let assume the solution of (68) is P ′s but not P ◦s . Denote the objective in (67)
as 12 log(J1(z, Ps)). Note that the objective in (68) is exactly 12 log(J1(z(P ◦s ), Ps)). Recall that for fixed
P ′s, the solution of (67) is z(P ′s), which leads to 12 log(J1(z(P ′s), P ′s)) ≥ 12 log(J1(z(P ◦s ), P ′s)). On the
other hand, 12 log(J1(z(P
◦
s ), P
◦
s )) ≥ 12 log(J1(z(P ′s), P ′s)) since P ◦s is the solution of (15). Combining
both gives 12 log(J1(z(P
◦
s ), P
◦
s )) ≥ 12 log(J1(z(P ◦s ), P ′s)) which violates the assumption that the solution
of (68) is P ′s but not P ◦s .
Further, J1(z, Ps) is a linear fractional function known to be quasi-linear [27], thus the maximum
always occurs at one of the two ends. Thus, the solution of (15) must be Pmin0 or P0. With this, we can
also obtain the optimal w according to Lemma 2.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
From the objective in the problem of (23), it should hold that (P0−Ps)α1z+α2 < (P0−Ps)α3G(z)+α4
for some Ps ∈ [0, P0], z ∈ [0, 1]. In other words, it should hold (P0 − Ps)(α3G(z) − α1z) > α2 − α4
for some Ps ∈ [0, P0], z ∈ [0, 1]. Denote K(z) = α3G(z) − α1z, z ∈ [0, 1]. It is easy to verify that:
1) K(0) = α3(1 − η2) > 0; 2) K ′′(z) < 0; 3) K ′(z) → +∞ as z → 0, K ′(1) < 0. Here K ′(z) and
K ′′(z) denote the first- and second- order derivatives, respectively. With these, first, if α2 < α4, then
(P0 − Ps)K(z) > α2 − α4 for some Ps ∈ [0, P0], z ∈ [0, 1] holds since K(0) > 0; second, if α2 > α4,
we know that K(z), z ∈ [0, 1] achieves its maximum at z0 with K ′(z0) = 0 (i.e., the unique root of the
equation α3G′(z)−α1 = 0), and (P0−Ps)K(z), Ps ∈ [0, P0], z ∈ [0, 1] achieves its maximum P0K(z0),
then, the condition should be P0K(z0) > α2 − α4.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
When z = 0 is fixed, the problem of (23) is reduced to
max
Ps
log
(
1 +
Ps
α2
)
− log
(
1 +
Ps
(P0 − Ps)α3(1− η2) + α4
)
(69)
s.t. Ps ∈ [0, P0].
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This is an optimization problem of a single variable Ps, and the maximum is achieved at one of the
following points: 0, P0 and the points with zero derivative. After some calculations, the desired results
are obtained.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPERTY 1
According to (23), we can write
Rs(z) = log
(
1 +
1
q1z + q2
)− log (1 + 1
q3G(z) + q4
) (70)
where q1 = (P0 − Ps)α1/Ps, q2 = α2/Ps, q3 = (P0 − Ps)α3/Ps and q4 = α4/Ps. It follows from
∂Rs
∂z
∣∣
z′
= − q1
(q1z′ + q2 + 1)(q1z′ + q2)
+
q3G
′(z′)
(q3G(z′) + q4 + 1)(q3G(z′) + q4)
= 0 (71)
that
(q3G(z
′) + q4 + 1)(q3G(z
′) + q4)
(q1z′ + q2 + 1)(q1z′ + q2)
=
q3G
′(z′)
q1
. (72)
On the other hand, we know
∂2Rs
∂z2
∣∣
z′
=
q21(2(q1z
′ + q2) + 1)
[(q1z′ + q2 + 1)(q1z′ + q2)]2
− (q3G
′(z′))2(2(q3G(z
′) + q4) + 1)
[(q3G(z′) + q4 + 1)(q3G(z′) + q4)]2
+
q3G
′′(z′)
(q3G(z′) + q4 + 1)(q3G(z′) + q4)
. (73)
Inserting (72) into (73) and using the fact: G′′(z′) < 0 and q3G(z′) + q4 > q1z′ + q2 (since z′ ∈ (z, z¯))
leads to the desired result.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
When the constraint w†G = 0 is added, the problem of (27) is reduced to
max
Ps,w
1
2
log
σ2 + Ps|h0|2 +w†Rhw
σ2 + Psmaxj∈I{|g0j |2} (74)
s.t. Ps ∈ [Pmin0 , P0], w†w = P0 − Ps,w†G = 0.
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From w†w = P0 − Ps and w†G = 0, we can obtain w =
√
P0 − PsEz and z†z = 1 which, when
inserted into (74), results in
max
Ps,z
1
2
log
σ2 + Ps|h0|2 + (P0 − Ps)z†E†RhEz
σ2 + Psmaxj∈I{|g0j |2} (75)
s.t. Ps ∈ [Pmin0 , P0], z†z = 1.
By using the fact z†E†RhEz achieves its maximum at z = E†h/‖E†h‖, we rewrite the problem of (75)
as
max
Ps
1
2
log
σ2 + Ps|h0|2 + (P0 − Ps)‖E†h‖2
σ2 + Psmaxj∈I{|g0j |2} (76)
s.t. Ps ∈ [Pmin0 , P0].
The objective in (76) is 12 log f2(Ps). Note that f2(Ps) is quasi-linear [27], thus the maximum occurs at
one of the two ends, namely, Pmin0 or P0.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF EQUIVALENT PROBLEM (33)
From the constraint x†x = 1, we can rewrite σ2 + Ps|h0|2 = (σ2 + Ps|h0|2)x†x and σ2 + Ps|g0j |2 =
(σ2 + Ps|g0j |2)x†x which enables us to rewrite the problem of (32) as
max
‖x‖=1
min
j∈I
x†R˜hx
x†R˜
j
gx
. (77)
Further, by denoting u = R˜1/2h x/‖R˜1/2h x‖, we can rewrite the problem of (77) as
max
u
min
j∈I
1
u†Aju
s.t. u†u = 1. (78)
By introducing the slack variable y to rewrite minj∈I 1/(u†Aju) = 1/y, we can rewrite the problem of
(78) as
max
u, y
1
y
s.t. u†u = 1, u†Aju ≤ y, j ∈ I. (79)
Let v = u/√y, then u†u = 1 is equivalent to ‖v‖2 = 1/y and we can rewrite the problem of (79) as the
problem of (33). Let the solution of (33) be v◦, then the solution of (78) is u◦ = v◦/‖v◦‖, the solution
of (77) is x◦ = R˜−1/2h v◦/‖R˜
−1/2
h v
◦‖.
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The first constraint of (40) leads to
(4R
0
s |g0|2 − |h0|2)Ps = w†(Rh − 4R0sRg)w − (4R0s − 1)σ2. (80)
There are two cases. If 4R0s |g0|2 − |h0|2 6= 0, it follows from (80) that Ps = w†R˜w + ζ . With this, we
can rewrite the problem of (40) as
min
w
w†w +w†R˜w + ζ s.t. w†R˜w + ζ ≥ Pmin0 . (81)
The optimal relay weight vector w◦ has the form of (d1u1 + d2u2) which follows from its optimality
condition of (81) [27]
w + R˜w − νR˜w = 0. (82)
where ν ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier. Indeed, inserting R˜ = λ1u1u†1 + λ2u2u†2 into (82) gives
w = (ν − 1)λ1(u†1w)u1 + (ν − 1)λ2(u†2w)u2. With this, we can rewrite (81) as
min
d1,d2
(1 + λ1)|d1|2 + (1 + λ2)|d2|2 + ζ (83)
s.t. λ1|d1|2 + λ2|d2|2 + ζ ≥ Pmin0 .
There are several case. If ζ ≥ Pmin0 , λ2 ≥ −1, then the solution is |d1| = 0, |d2| = 0; If ζ ≥ Pmin0 ,
λ2 < −1, then the solution is |d1| = 0, |d2|2 = (ζ − Pmin0 )/|λ2|; If ζ < Pmin0 , the solution is |d1|2 =
(Pmin0 − ζ)/λ1, |d2| = 0.
Similarly, we can obtain the other results in Theorem 3.
APPENDIX J
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
When z = 0 is fixed, the problem of (47) is reduced to
min
γ
P0 =
α2[γα3(1− ρ2) + α4]
γα3(1− ρ2) + α4 − α2 + γ (84)
s.t. γ >
α2 − α4
α3(1− ρ2) , γ ≥ 0.
This is an optimization problem of a single variable γ, and the maximal is achieved at one of the following
points: 0 and the points with zero derivative. After some calculations, the desired results are obtained.
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APPENDIX K
PROOF OF PROPERTY 2
It follows from
∂fγ2
∂z
∣∣
z′
=
−γα1
(γα1z′ + α2)2
+
γα3F
′(z′)
(γα3F (z′) + α4)2
= 0 (85)
that
(γα3F (z
′) + α4)
2
(γα1z′ + α2)2
=
α3F
′(z′)
α1
. (86)
On the other hand, we know
∂2fγ2
∂z2
∣∣
z′
=
2(γα1)
2
(γα1z′ + α2)3
− 2(γα3F
′(z′))2
(γα3F (z′) + α4)3
+
γα3F
′′(z′)
(γα3F (z′) + α4)2
. (87)
Inserting (86) into (87) and using the fact: F ′′(z′) < 0 and γα3F (z′)+α4 > γα1z′+α2 (since z′ ∈ (z, z¯))
leads to the desired result.
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Fig. 3. Simulation model: source, relays, destination, eavesdroppers are placed along a line; Upper one for Fig. 4, 5, 7; Lower
one for Fig. 8.
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Fig. 4. Secrecy rate vs. source-destination distance (power constraint: 30 dBm, source-relay distance: 5m, number of relays:
N = 10, one eavesdropper (J = 1), source-eavesdropper distance: 50m).
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Fig. 5. Secrecy rate vs. source-destination distance (power constraint: 30 dBm, source-relay distance: 5m, number of relays:
N = 10, number of eavesdroppers: J = 7, source-eavesdropper distance: 50m).
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Fig. 6. Secrecy rate vs. number of eavesdroppers (power constraint: 30 dBm, source-relay distance: 5m, number of relays:
N = 10, source-destination distance: 25m, source-eavesdropper distance: 50m).
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Fig. 7. Transmit power vs. source-destination distance (secrecy rate constraint: 1 bits/s/Hz, source-relay distance: 5m, the
number of relays: N = 10, one eavesdropper (J = 1), source-eavesdropper distance: 50m).
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Fig. 8. Transmit power vs. source-eavesdropper distance (secrecy rate constraint: 1 bits/s/Hz, source-relay distance: 5m,
number of relays: N = 10, one eavesdropper (J = 1), source-destination distance: 50m).
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